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THE NATURAL LAW BASIS OF JURIDICAL INSTITUTIONS
IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM*
by
BRENDAN

F. BROWNt

Mr. Chairman, and Fellow Workers in the field of Catholic Legal
Education: I am very grateful for this opportunity to discuss a matter in
which I have long been interested, for I believe it is of the utmost importance for the cause of Catholic legal education. I refer to the necessity
of producing a large and ever increasing literature which will show the
great extent to which the Anglo-American Common law has already
implemented the natural law, and why it should continue to do so in the
future. When this literature becomes available, it is bound to exert a
profoundly beneficial influence upon the direction of the legal order in
our society, and help to guarantee the future security of fundamental
human rights.
Two aspects of the problem of producing this literature, namely, the
men and the method, may be considered, apart from the aspect of corporate scholarship. I am concerned with a general demonstration of the
affirmative and constructive method, which should be followed. It should
be largely historical, comparative and inductive, to be most effective
against the methods of those scholars who have sought to demolish confidence in the practical efficacy of a philosophy of natural law.
Contributions to this literature will be made by jurists who are
familiar with both law and scholastic philosophy. Certain Catholic legal
educators, particularly Father Lucey,' have articulated the need of persuading a few, select scholars, especially trained in this philosophy and in
the moral sciences, therefore, to undertake the study of law. These
scholars would become members of the faculties of Catholic Law Schools
and advise others on the Faculty, how the philosophy of natural law might
be best introduced into the various courses. The advice, so given, would
ultimately be reduced to the form of books and articles available for all.
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This plan of obtaining the men might be reversed by inducing certain
able and interested lawyers to study scholastic philosophy.
The possibilities of the hitherto emphasized abstract and destructive
approach, which attacked the limitations and excesses of legal philosophies, on the moral level, opposed to the scholastic notion of natural law,
have been temporarily exhausted. The negative method is, of course,
useful, but it must now be supplemented by a more legalistic consideration
of the issues. It is as important to show what the norms of the natural
law offer and have offered, in the field of jurisprudence, or applied legal
philosophy, for the establishment of traditional ways of solving moral
conflicts, as it is to stress the absurdities of the philosophical premises of
our adversaries.
The chief problem of every legal order, regardless of the degree of
maturity and irrespective of the character of the surrounding political and
social organizations, is to ascertain, from a priori assumptions, the remedies which will be allowed when specific fact patterns arise. These
assumptions may be a matter of political or military compulsion, to be
followed, even though the personnel of that order disagrees with their
wisdom or justice. Again these assumptions may be the result of a free
and deliberate choice by those entrusted with the operation of that order,
or of a subconscious motivation. But in any event, the measure of these
assumptions must be physical or moral, and the legal order is under the
necessity of making the one or the other principally controlling.
According to objective natural law, the persons included in a particular relationship must be considered as reasoning and free-willing
entities, who, because of their very nature and of a divine purpose, are
subject to the authority of a higher law, which they perceive, at least in
general. A juridical doctrine, such as that of consideration in contracts,
or of liability without fault in torts, is just, whether viewed from the position of the individual or of society, only insofar as it implements the
logical derivatives of the natural law. A doctrine may ignore these
derivatives, or it may give the greatest possible expression to them, consistent with the limits of effective legal action, or it may undergo historical
evolution from one extreme to the other.
The Anglo-American Common law doctrine of consideration did
conform to a philosophy of natural law, but only imperfectly and haltingly. The blight which had fallen on the Common law in virtue of that
strange phenomenon of the fourteenth century, making the writ the
starting point by severing it from the moral order, and enshrining the
mechanical and analytical criterion of stare decisis, affected all its doctrines,
including that of consideration. Yet, in the first decade of the seventeenth

century, the Common law took the revolutionary step in Slade's Case,2 of
irrevocably treating the individuals involved in a transaction of sale as
human beings with the capacity to will freely, and with the obligation to
exercise their will so as to assume responsibility. Hence Slade's Case
may be evaluated as a long delayed response to that dictate of the natural
law which prescribes that the will-factor must be related to every just
juridical arrangement. The volitional element was thus given recognition
by the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit.
But evidence of the reason-factor, also required by the natural law,
was limited by the Common law to proof of an exchange of something
for something, in a materialistic sense, (i.e.) consideration. It was considered reasonable by the Common law to enforce only those agreements
which were based upon consideration. This identification of reasonableness with consideration was due to raising the specific fact situation in
Slade's Case to the level of an exclusive universal. But it was only accidental that this case involved a sale, and that it was the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit, which was broadened by the inclusion of the consensual
element. Legal elements derived from the law of procedure, debt and
sales obscured the necessary factor of reason in the Common law doctrine
of consideration. But that doctrine was an imperfect attempt to follow a
requirement of the natural law, although the Common law was not
concerned with moral obligation as such.
Long before Slade's Case, however, while the Common law was still
struggling to evolve a law of contracts from the delictual writs and
actions, the ecclesiastical Chancellors had formulated a law of contracts
based on the idea of causa, as elaborated by the Canon law. This idea,
which the Roman law used to express the element of reason in willed
obligations, had made possible the specific performance of certain types of
agreements in Chancery. The moral test of enforcement of certain kinds
of agreements was more reasonable than the principally mechanical criterion of consideration. In the beginning, Chancery followed the conception of Canonical causa, which was the reason which the law considered
as sufficient for the creation of a legally enforceable agreement. But
ultimately, the structure of the doctrine of consideration in Chancery
became similar to that of the Common law, with lessening emphasis upon
the philosophy of natural law. That philosophy was later vindicated,
however, even though under the disguise of fiction and doubtful logic, by
the numerous modifications of the Common law doctrine of consideration,
and by arbitrarily expanding the sphere of contract law so as to make it
include such equitable concepts as those of unilateral contract, promissory
estoppel, and injurious reliance.
24

Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602).

The law of torts is one of the most normative in the curriculum,
highly dependent upon the natural law. But even the greatest authorities
on tort law have tended to camouflage its moral content by the use of
subtle terms and definitions in texts and case-books, indoctrinating students
with a preference for the amoral approach. Thus they have emphasized
the word "interests", in the presentation of the law of torts, as contrasted
with "rights" and "equities". The word "interests", which the Sociological
and Realist Schools of Jurisprudence introduced to supersede "rights" and
"equities" as descriptive of the most fundamental substratum with which
the legal order is concerned, stresses the psychological and materialistic
claims and appetites of man regarded as a non-moral entity.
By their definition of a tort, even such eminent authorities as the late
Dean Wigmore and Professor Kocourek have contributed willingly or
unwillingly to the obscurity of the ethical premise upon which the law of
torts rests. Thus Dean Wigmore has defined a tort as the violation of an
irrecusable nexus, (i.e.) a relationship which may not be denied or
rejected. But he does not disclose the reason, which causes the law to
impose an inescapable duty. Nor does Professor Kocourek, who has described a tort in terms of physical science, as the breach of an unpolarized
private duty, explain the cause of this obligation. These authorities do
not correlate their definitions with the historical fact that the English
Common law began, and continued for centuries, to enforce duties in the
field of delict because they resulted from an objective natural law.
The development of the law of torts from the actions of trespass and
trespass on the case assumes jurisprudential significance, when these
actions are appraised as attempts to carry into effect the natural law.
Originally, these two actions were merely crude and perhaps subconscious
efforts to do this, doctrinally stressing the physical differences of certain
fact-situations, (i.e.) whether the injury was direct or indirect. Although
considerable time was required before it was recognized that the direct
injury remedied by the action of trespass constituted a distinct category
because of the will-factor involved, and that the indirect injury covered
by the action of trespass on the case was actionable because it was the
result of negligence, or conduct contrary to right reason, however unintentional, nevertheless, these two actions sought to redress moral wrongs
under the natural law. The law of torts began to assume its modern
appearance, however, only after the specific sources of human culpability,
according to that law, namely will and reason, began to be related to
trespass and trespass on the case.
The doctrine of "liability without fault" responds to a natural law
critique in the determination of its proper limits. In the stage of all
primitive law, including the English, there is legal liability without moral
fault, because of the predominantly materialistic, impersonal and objective

attitude of the positive law toward the damage or loss in question, which
is connected only with the proximate cause. Slowly but surely, as the
social need of integrating law and morals is realized and satisfied, by the
infiltration of the persuasive norms of the natural law into the thought
processes of judges and legislators, legal liability becomes identified more
and more with the moral fault of the individual. This takes place in an
era which is primarily concerned with private, as distinguished from public
and social, rights and duties and continues until the sociological period
is reached.
Some authorities on the law of torts contend that there was a return
to the old formula of liability without fault, in this sociological period, as
exemplified by the case of Rylands v. Fletcher,' and the enactment of
such statutes as the Workmen's Compensation Acts. The impression may
be left with the student that the law of torts lost its moral and natural
law content when this occurred, if the change is presented as an adoption
of the principle of a balancing of the social interest against that of the
individual, and of the intrinsic absolute value of the social solidarity, apart
from the members of society, as advocated by certain sociological jurists.
It is important that this change be interpreted as an extension of the
concept of justice from commutative to social, rather than as a shift from
the doctrine of liability only if there is moral fault to that of liability
without fault. Justification of the change must be sought in the balancing
of equities or moral interests, and in the support of the social claim, given
by the natural law. Thus in the instance of the Workmen's Compensation
Acts, it is a question of social justice, not simply whether the rich employer
should be compelled to pay, since he is the one best able to do so.
The standard of the reasonable man, which has enabled judges and
law-makers to introduce into the law of torts numerous ethical principles,
supplied a criterion which was objective, and in ultimate analysis, absolute
and immutable. The reasonable man, so indispensable for the creation
of tort law, affords an objective measure of moral and legal conduct,
unlike the subjective tests, furnished by the individual conscience, which
were advanced by certain post-Reformational theories of natural law. In
this respect, the criterion of the reasonable man conforms to the idea of
natural law, as understood by Stoic and Scholastic. Conformity may also
be found in the absolute and immutable character of the test of the reasonable man, which is derived from intrinsic reasonableness, not from human
will, or economic utility.
The development of tort law may be traced roughly in terms of the
expanding application of the natural law which attaches moral culpability
to unjustified interference with the morally free will, and to behavior
8L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).

contrary to that of a reasonable man. The emergence of such torts as
duress, deceit and fraud evidenced the efforts of tort law to make actionable
the overcoming of another's morally free will by force, or the hampering
of its operation by the suppression or twisting of essential facts. As soon
as the ethical consequences of motive were accepted by the legal order, a
new series of torts arose, grounded on the mental factor of purpose, such
as the tort of malicious prosecution.
The doctrine of negligence was modified by that of contributory
negligence. The basis of this limiting doctrine was the survival of a
mechanical test of legal liability, which arose in the primitive era of the
law of torts, namely, proximate cause. This survival was advantageous,
from the evidentiary point of view, for trial by jury. But it had the
unavoidable effect of affording legal immunity, in certain situations, to
unreasonable or morally culpable conduct, otherwise regarded as actionable.
The unique and hybrid juridical institution of contributory negligence invites contrast with the doctrine of comparative negligence,
prevailing in the law of a few of the States of the Union, and in legal
systems, derived from the Roman. This contrast is manifest with regard
to the difference of method which the respective doctrines follow in
assessing legal liability, when both plaintiff and defendant are negligent.
But it is not so clear as to which is more expressive of the objectives of the
natural law. It would appear, however, that the doctrine of comparative
negligence was the more moral of the two doctrines, and hence more
sensitive to the demands of the natural law. This is not to say, however,
that the doctrine of contributory negligence is not an expression of the
natural law, but only that it is a less perfect expression.
The juster and more socially useful and beneficial positive law,
whether it related to the assumed obligation of contract, or to the imposed
duty of tort, was made by the Chancellors, not by the Common law judges.
This was so because moralists and legal philosophers were, by training
and temperament, more skillful in choosing legal forms for channeling the
natural law into the arena of judicial decision, than analytical jurists,
whose vision did not extend beyond the positive law. It is a truism which
not even the most anti-natural law type of jurist can deny, in the face of
historical evidence, that the Anglo-American law of torts would have been
inadequate for the solution of complex social problems, had not the Court
of Chancery applied norms more just than those of the Common law.
It is well known that Chancery asserted its jurisdiction in cases of moral
wrongdoing, which were not regarded as tortious by the Common law
judges. It emphasized the ethical approach, acting in personam by injunction in the field of torts, as well as in that of contracts. It cognized
damage over and above mere monetary loss.

The principles of property law, embodied in the decisions of the
Chancellors, were logical extensions of the philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas, as expressed in his SUMMA THEOLOGICA, wherein he upheld
the right of private property and its just exercise on both utilitarian and
idealistic grounds. Chancery supplemented the Common law of real
property with numerous devices to provide greater recognition of the
inalienable right of each individual in society to acquire, retain, and
transfer a reasonable amount of property. Thus it allowed married women
certain property rights in land, denied by the Common law at one time,
because of the fiction of the unity of marriage and the amoral absorption
of the personality of the wife into that unity, represented only by the
husband. Sensitive to the natural law, Chancery corrected this situation
by recognizing the ownership of land by married women when made
equitable by the vesting of the legal estate in trustees.
The device of trustees to preserve contingent remainders was allowed
by the Chancellors to mitigate some of the rigorous consequences of the
idea of seisin, which played a commanding role in the English land law.
A contingent remainder lapsed unless the condition, upon which it depended, was met before or at the immediate termination of the life estate,
simply because the Common law would not permit any abeyance of the
seisin. It would not tolerate such abeyance, despite injustice to the remainderman, for it was feudally important to know who had the seisin, or
possession of an estate of freehold, since it was he who owed the duty of
rendering the appropriate services to the over-lord.
The Common law always presumed the existence of the right of
private property in land, however much it restricted that right to certain
classes of persons, and interfered with its reasonable exercise by arbitrary
and artificial notions. But the natural law origin of that right was not at
first the concern of the Common law, tending to follow the social pattern
of the age, which made the ownership of land a reward for the performance of military services. In keeping with this social pattern, was the
dominance of the conceptof physical power, or possession, as the factual,
as well as the legal, indicia of ownership of real property. But with
almost the same inexorableness as Hegel's idea, realizing itself in the
formation of positive law, the concept of scholastic natural law worked
changes in the English land law, which bear striking resemblances to those
wrought by the Stoic version of natural law in the Jus Civile, coinciding
with the period of the strict Roman law. Unlike the Hegelian hypothesis,
however, the inevitability of the transforming authority of the natural law
was not the product of some mystical force, which overpowered the human
will. It was rather the result of the competence of the human intellect to
know the existence of a directive and regulatory program, consonant
with the nature of man, and the purpose of the Force which created him.

It was the effect of the pressure of reason inducing the human will, at
least in the long run, to act in accordance with that program.
The recognition of the individual's right to personal property, by
the English Common law, was delayed by an over-emphasis upon real
property, resulting from feudal notions. But eventually a law of personal
property sprang up, inspired by the Roman law, devoid of those feudal,
political and economic objectives, which had tended to obfuscate the
natural law principle that the right of private property inhered in the
human personality, and should be coextensive with all the members of
every community with equality of enforcement. Bracton, the noted ecclesiastical jurist of the thirteenth century, has been credited with the
authorship of a considerable part of the law of personal property in England, inserting relevant materials, borrowed from the Roman law, into
the interstices and lacunae of the English law, which his researches into
that law disclosed.
The numerous restrictions which have been placed by law upon the
exercise of the right of private property, beginning in the United States,
the latter part of the nineteenth century, are compatible with the premise
that scholastic philosophy does not ordain the preservation of any particular property status quo. These restrictions, exemplified by the growth
of administrative law and the establishment of the great federal commissions, as well as by the limitations placed upon the individual in the
matter of acquiring, using and disposing of property, may be scholastically
interpreted as efforts by the legal order to compel the property owner to
fulfill his moral obligations towards others in the societal relationship.
These obligations are rooted in the natural law, which has always been
alert to the sociological implications of private property. Any other
justification of the socialization of private property, which has taken place
within recent years, may conceivably open the door to theories, counseling
the serious impairment, or even the destruction, of the right to such
property.
A philosophy of natural law, through the media of Admiralty, Canon
and Roman laws, produced the essential characteristics of the law of
agency in England. Mariners, citizens of the world, and hence free to
follow the dictates of natural law in the selection of juridical institutions,
wrote the Rhodian Sea Law, the genesis of the law of Admiralty. The
Rhodian Sea Law contained the rudiments of a law of agency, pertaining
to both contracts and torts. This law was incorporated into the Digest,
constituting part of the CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS of Justinian, the great
legal monument of the sixth century, A.D. The example of the Canon
law, which had borrowed the Roman concept of agency, and applied it to
the conduct of the affairs of religious corporations, such as monasteries and
convents, supplied experience for the construction of an English law of

agency. It is true, of course, that, in England, the idea of representation
was fitted into the feudal survival of status, found first in the relation of
master and slave, and thereafter, in that of lord and vassal, lord and serf,
and lastly, master and servant.
The Anglo-American criminal law rests upon an assumed moral
order which may be historically demonstrated to be scholastic. It
emerged as a distinct category of delict with the gradual recognition
of offenses against the social interest. This moral order was, at first,
clothed with customary law, later with judicial positive law, and finally with
legislation, which defined various classes of crime and prescribed specific
punishments. In its evolutionary quest for progressively greater effectuation of this moral order, the lode star of the English criminal law was
social justice, transcending the concept of merely commutative justice,
referable to the commission of certain offenses, which grossly exceeded
the injustice of those wrongs, now known as civil, and hence called for
social punishment.
But punishment does not make crime, nor does the extent of the
punishment determine the gravity of the crime, although that may be the
impression left with students of criminal law by the common definition of
a felony, as an offense punishable by death or by imprisonment in the
penitentiary, and of a misdemeanor as an act, calling for lesser punishment. It is the duty of the scholastic teacher to insist that these definitions
reflect the position of the analytical, not the natural law, School of Jurisprudence, and that they conceal the true essence of crime.
Punishment is rather the consequence of crime, inflicted by the State
for a variety of reasons. Support for the deterrent, preventive, and vindicative theories of punishment, advanced by legal philosophers and
criminologists, may be discovered in the logical implications of the natural
law. In some respects the theory of such criminologists as Beccaria, who
taught that the punishment should fit the criminal, not the crime, resembles the medicinal function of punishment, expressed in the phrase, epoena
medicinalis," and advocated by the proponents of scholastic natural law.
But these proponents do not favor the relaxation or abolition of criminal
punishment on the theory that criminals are principally the victims of
birth and environment, which render the culprit morally and legally
unaccountable. The punishment inflicted upon the criminal, however,
should be regarded partly in the nature of a penance, intended to strengthen his character by bringing home the gravity of the offense, and affording him a chance to reform, consistent with the right and duty of
society to protect itself.
Although physical force does not determine the justice of the principles upon which the penal order rests, nevertheless, it is essential for the
administration of criminal justice. The natural law is not physically self89

executing. Sometimes it must be enforced by superior might against those
who are ready to resort to physical force to subvert its norms, or to substitute false values of human conduct in its place. This is true of both the
national and the international penal orders.
A consideration of the Anglo-American law of criminal procedure,
from the point of view of natural law, yields significant results. Ecclesiastical intervention by the Lateran Council, in 1215, on the side of natural
law philosophy, outlawed the crude and primitive modes of trial by ordeal,
which had appeared in England, before 1066 A.D. These non-rational
modes of determining innocence or criminal guilt were misguided appeals
to the supernatural, not asking for Divine wisdom, but presumptuously,
calling upon God for a miracle, as evidence of the innocence of the accused. The action of the Lateran Council enabled the rational mode of
trial by jury to prevail over the non-rational methods with which it had
been forced to compete for centuries.
Insofar as trial by jury was a rational means of determining facts for
use in the judicial process, it was appropriate for the purpose of applying
the natural law. But it should not be regarded per se as the most appropriate. This may be attested by the results of the administration of
justice, both criminal and civil, under the Canon and Military law, and, at
one time, under the inquisitional procedure of the European continent.
But the institution of trial by jury, however modified, will most likely long
survive in Anglo-American society, not because it is the most accurate
means of ascertaining facts, but because of the widespread conviction that
any other arrangement would endanger constitutional rights and liberties,
originating in the natural law, according to the traditional American
political philosophy.
A unitary, rather than a preclusive, type of pleading and procedure
would seem to be best adapted to the realization of the aims of the natural
law, since it seeks the presentation of all the factual and jural issues of a
controversy in one judicial action, with a final determination affecting all
parties involved. Chancery pleading and practice, like the Roman adjective law, in its third or libellary stage, were essentially unitary in character. Common law pleading and practice were at first highly preclusive,
as was Roman procedure in its first two stages, (i.e.) the legis actio and
the formulary. But in each of these two systems of law, the movement
was from the preclusive to the unitary type. The latter produced the
model to which statutes finally conformed in the institution of procedural
reform.
The course on Constitutional law makes available a fertile field for
the consideration of the scholastic conception of society, the state and
government, and their relation to the legal order under the Constitution,
intended as a bulwark against the invasion of the rights of the individual
90

by the sovereign. The Constitution of the United States is neither objective natural law, nor a mere algebraic equation, describing an equilibrium
of economic pressures and political compromises. But it is a manifestation
of objective natural law in the same sense as were the Magna Charta and
the American Declaration of Independence.
It was not until the time of Henry VIII, in the sixteenth century,
and thereafter, that the philosophy of force, relative to the ascertainment
of the legitimate limits of state action, was given currency in England.
This philosophy was formally elaborated in the analytical or imperative
theory of Hobbes. In English and American constitutional theory, this
philosophy competed for acceptance with the older English conception of
the nature and function of the state, which had been in accord with the
state-limitation doctrine of scholastic philosophy.
Thus far the philosophy of force has prevailed in English constitutional theory. A Parliamentary Bill of Attainder may today be unjust,
but never illegal. The test of the juridicity of a statute or enactment of
Parliament is to be found in the will and physical power of the sovereign,
not in the sphere of morals.
But the philosophy of an objective natural law has been accepted,
for the most part, in American constitutional theory, as manifested by the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. This doctrine upholds the opinions expressed in Bonham's Case4 and Calvin's Case,' that an act of a legislature
which is contrary to the natural law does not have the force of law,
although it may have the appearance of such. As far back as the American Declaration of Independence, however, the philosophy of an objective
natural law was obliged to compete with belief in the moral supremacy
of the authority of the people, as expressed in their highest legislative
assembly. That Declaration simultaneously asserted the natural law
principle of self evident, inalienable rights, springing from an immutable,
objective order of morality, and the subjective proposition that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. For the
scholastic jurist, the foundation of the natural law is not the will of a
majority of the people at any particular time, although there is a reliable,
but rebuttable, presumption that the will of the people, freely expressed,
with a knowledge of the facts, is the voice of God.
A considerable analytical influence appears in most treatises on the
law of Corporations. The view presented in these treatises is that a
corporation is a fiction, and that only the State has the right to originate
this fiction. The fiction theory of the corporation exalts the absolute
sovereignty of the State and ignores the natural law right of association,
48 Coke 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
57 Coke la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (1610).
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which precedes the State. This theory may be invoked to justify the State's
seizure of the corporation's property, as ownerless, should the State erase
the fiction.
The fiction theory of the corporation is contradicted by the scholastic
view which is that the corporation is a metaphysical entity, and that the
State does not create the underlying moral personality, which is incorporated, as it were, by the natural law, but only gives it legal recognition,
and determines, in a reasonable manner, the scope of its operation. The
essence of a corporation results from the natural law right of association,
and from the metaphysical and conceptual relation of the persons, who
form the corporation, to the central entity.
It was the influence of natural law thinking, which corrected the
original conception of a mortgage, as an outright conveyance of the full
ownership of land, to be forfeited upon failure to pay a sum of money at a
future split second of time. The Court of Chancery, applying moral principles, obtained jurisdiction over the mortgage by preventing injustices
arising from failure to pay the money at the specific time, caused by accident, mistake, vis major, or Act of God. The course of development of
the device of the mortgage was determined by natural law, which communicated the idea that the true purpose of a mortgage was to provide
security for a debt. The mortgaged property thus became simply collateral, or a means to an end. The mortgagee no longer owned the land,
subject to a condition subsequent, but either held legal title to the property
as a quasi-trustee, or had a lien on the land to the extent of the debt.
The Law Merchant is of special concern and interest for the natural
law jurist, because he finds, therein, an historical vindication of the
capacity of men, when freed from totemism and taboo, and from the
inhibiting effect of provincial environments, to create just customary law
inspired by natural law, for the authoritative settlement of disputes. The
formation of legal categories, new even to the Roman law, resulting from
the invention and the use of bills and notes and from the idea of negotiability, by merchants, who were cosmopolitans, evidenced the creative
power of a notion like bona fides taken from the natural law. The Law
Merchant supports the thesis that custom may have the force of law, as a
means of social discipline, although it does not rest on the will of the
political sovereign, but on objective standards of reason.
It is well known that the moral content in the subject of "Equity"
and its historical natural law foundation have been progressively concealed for many years by some teachers and authors. Much evidence
attests this fact. Thus the name of the subject was changed from "Equity
Jurisprudence" to "Equity". Less and less attention was paid to the
maxims, (i.e.) moral generalizations, reflecting the spirit of ethical ideal92

ism. Lords Nottingham, Hardwicke and Eldon were hailed as the greatest
of the Chancellors, because they were chiefly responsible for the transference of moral principles into positive rule. Finally, within the past few
years, some of the "prestige" law schools have abolished "Equity" as a
separate course.
It is the duty of the scholastic jurist to resist this trend and make
specific efforts to expose its Realist implications. If this is not done, the
law student will be denied his educational birthright, which includes the
knowledge that the equity administered in the English Court of Chancery
was not emotion, nor the changing moral conscience of the time and place,
nor the caprice of the Chancellor, but rather that body of transcendental
principles of right and wrong, existing in the metaphysical order, which
may be identified as natural law.
Once "Equity" began to be taught merely as a body of rules, even
though presented historically, the way was being prepared for its eventual
banishment from the curriculum. The ensemble, as such, of the conclusions reached by judges, exercising equitable powers, can never be the
sum total of "Equity". Hence the perennial discussion, which was continued for many years in round tables of the Association of American Law
Schools, as to whether "Equity" has become decadent, has only a limited
significance, (i.e.) whether its positive rules are still reasonably responsive
to the standards of the natural law.
Extrinsic or transcendental equity has provided ideals which have
been transfused into the empty categories of "due process," equal protection
of the laws, and the like, of the Federal Constitution, and made possible
the development of American Constitutional law. It has produced norms
for the interpretation of ambiguous statutes. It has been indispensable in
all those fields, wherein justice is administered without law. It has been
employed in effecting settlements by mediation and arbitration, and adjudicating issues in administrative tribunals. It is the only medium of
international social control in the absence of developed juridical institutions in the world order.
Intrinsic equity, or the casuistic application of transcendental equity
in the judicial, administrative, or legislative process, historically followed
the employment of fictions as a means of modifying or abolishing old law,
and creating new law. The equitable method produced new law, with no
fictional changing of the facts, by reliance on certain principles, which
dominated the choice of the major premise by the law-maker, because of
their internal reasonableness. Intrinsic equity may be expelled from a
legal system, for a while, but the history of both Roman and English law
shows that when this happens, it becomes necessary eventually to construct
a new court for the restoration of applied equity.

The time limitations placed on this paper prevent me from subjecting
other segments of the Anglo-American positive law to a scholastic critique.
But the method which I have endeavored to demonstrate may be applied
effectively to the remainder, so as to disclose how social utility made it
pragmatically imperative for law-makers to shape the principal institutions in the Anglo-American legal system in accordance with the philosophy of an objective natural law, although the experience of centuries was
sometimes required to induce action in this respect.
May the time come soon when the scholastic interpretation of legal
history will take its rightful place, in the libraries and class-rooms of the
world, commanding the respect and admiration of scholars everywhere,
and facilitating the task of the church law school, to train not only worthy
ministers of justice, but also molders of the legal order.

